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He points out that the rational exegesis of the great ‘‘Peshatists’’ (hap˘esˇa¯ t¯ıyyim/alpaˇsa¯ tiyyah) Saadiah Gaon and R. Samuel ben Chofni on halakhic matters deserves more study: ‘‘and if one rejects them in this respect, one rejects even more the evidence they adduce from the Arabic language’’ (w˘e’im h¯em magd¯ıl¯ım k˘em¯o zeh al¯eyhem kol sˇekk¯en sˇeyyagd¯ıl¯u mah sˇemm¯ev¯ı’¯ım ’¯ot¯o l˘e e¯ d min hall¯asˇo¯ n h¯a ar¯av¯ı/fa-hum yunkir¯una mitla h¯ad¯a alayhim fa dlan ’an yunkir¯u m¯a yastaˇshid¯u bihi min al-lafz al- arab¯ı) (1886: 8).

Maimonides accepts the task of resolving this perplexity by explaining the characteristics of figurative meaning upon which he builds his philosophic and scientific themes and concepts (Kadushin 1973: 102–6). However, the question remains what Maimonides thinks of the literal sense of Hebrew Scripture. Does Maimonides agree with the rabbinic view that p˘esˇa¯ t and d˘er¯asˇ are two separate things? Is his idea of figurative meaning really the same as d˘er¯asˇ? The search for answers leads to a complex of factors which play a part in Maimonidean thinking.

Not compound, and absolutely inaccessible in positive terms. As a semantic entity, this ma n a¯ acquires significance through opposition and contrast (Faur 1986: 79–83). How does Maimonides relate his thinking about ma n a¯ to rabbinic tradition? Repeatedly he refers to the saying of Rabbi Ishmael: ‘‘The Torah speaks in the language of the sons of man’’ (dibb˘er¯ah T¯or¯ah kil˘esˇo¯ n b˘en¯ey ’¯ad¯am) in order ‘‘to denote everything that all men are capable of understanding and representing to themselves at first thought’’ (I,26; 56) (ma n a¯ d¯alika ’anna kull m¯a yumkinu n-n¯as ’aˇgma fahmuhu wa-tasawwuruhu bi-’awwal fikrihi (58) / iny a¯ n zeh k¯ıy k˘ol mah sˇe’efˇsa¯ r livn¯ey ’¯ad¯am k¯ull¯am hav¯an¯at¯o w˘eziyy¯ur¯o bit˘ehillat hammahasˇa¯ v¯ah) (42).